[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
.[38] According to Miller,  We wantedto make it so that they couldn't have all that money for their clinics and their hospitalsunless they voted for health education as well. [12]The media campaign was the main bone of contention; Miller expected the industry totry to kill it.Steve Scott, political editor of the California Journal, observed that themedia program  was the main issue because& it was that component that botheredthem [the tobacco industry] the most.I mean the tax was the tax, there was nothingthey could do about it, but the notion that Californians would be educated and thatthere would be a specific media component to it was what terrified them. [39] AsMiller and Scott expected, in September, after AB 75 had moved out of theConference Committee, the tobacco industry emerged from the shadows and launchedan all-out lobbying blitz to kill the anti-tobacco media campaign.During the final days of the Conference Committee, tobacco industry contractlobbyists saturated legislators.[41][40][41] On September 13 Assembly Members Bronzanand Isenberg and Senators Keene and Rosenthal sent an alert to their fellow memberswarning them that twenty-five lobbyists had been hired by the tobacco industry to tryto kill the provisions authorizing the anti-smoking television ads.[42] Miller recalledthe dramatic standoff inside the Conference Committee:The blitz of lobbying was awesome the tobacco industry brought in the  first teamfrom Washington, D.C., and New York.They literally hired every contract lobbyistaround.They would hire a lobbyist just to win one vote.Judge Garibaldi, then thepreeminent contract lobbyist, told Senator Watson the industry offered him a blankcheck he could fill in any amount he wished, just to add his clout to the contest.Prior to adoption of the Conference Committee report, the industry had brought highpressure on the six members to target all tobacco education to youth.They clearlyhad the Republican members, and were about to win some of the Democrats (anddestroy health education).Before a vote could be taken, however, Phil Isenberg andBruce Bronzan stood up from the table, stepped to the front of the room, and publiclyrefused to have anything further to do with the conference.Both men shamed theircolleagues, Isenberg described the youth proposal as one of the cheapest tricks hehad witnessed.The demonstration by both men effectively killed the  youth onlyeffort and assured adoption of a legitimate health education proposal.[13] [emphasisadded] 114 When the bill moved to the Assembly floor, tobacco lobbyists were lined up three andfour deep along the public railing outside the Assembly chamber, sending messages into legislators and talking to them as they went into the chamber.[43] Mary Adams, theACS lobbyist at the time, noted,  The tobacco industry was handing out $10,000checks to any and every lobbyist it could find who would work on the issue.It was ahoot to see who was at the railing! They would have hired my cat if she had been aregistered lobbyist! [44] The industry was successful in reaching some legislators,most notably Senator Maddy and Speaker Brown, both of whom questioned the valueof using Health Education Account money for a massive and untested mediacampaign.[19]Fortunately for public health advocates, the tobacco industry went too far andgenerated a backlash among many legislators.In Bronzan's words, the lobbyingcampaign became  so gross and so obvious that it becomes dangerous for[lawmakers] to associate themselves with it. [43] The health advocates alerted themedia to the tobacco industry's lobbying tactics.Walters summed up the effort in hisSacramento Bee column:  The tobacconists may have made a tactical error.Theirheavy-handed push drew attention from news media, which put the politicians on thespot and, in the end, they abandoned the drive and the ad money remained. [45]Walters declared the industry's defeat a public victory over narrower interests.In 1989 politicians still saw implementing the voter mandate as a priority.Theindustry had put itself in the limelight with a too-obvious lobbying effort.Once again,outside attention had worked to the advantage of the health groups and to the defeat ofthe industry.The Research AccountWhile the Health Education Account was widely debated and many proposals werefloated for how to use the money, the Research Account attracted far less attention.The Research Account, like the Public Resources Account, was not  on the tablebecause it was viewed as an earmarked account.[46] Everyone assumed that the 5percent allocation specified by the initiative would be put into research.Three issueshad to be resolved concerning the Research Account: (1) who would administer it, (2)how indirect costs (overhead) would be handled, and (3) what kinds of research wouldbe funded.None of the preferences that the voluntary agencies had initially expressedended up in the final legislation. 115 Instead, the preferences of the governor and the University of California (UC)prevailed.The voluntaries wanted DHS to administer the money and limit the amount of indirectcosts that could be charged to research grants funded out of the Proposition 99Research Account.In their view, indirect costs would involve general support for theuniversities rather than support for tobacco-related work.By January 20, 1989, theCalifornia research universities had drafted their own statement of principles,supporting UC as the lead agency, establishing scientific merit as the basis for awards,and requiring the payment of all research costs, both direct and indirect, consistentwith federal guidelines.[47] The private universities opposed limiting overhead.(Stanford's overhead at the time was higher than 80 percent.[1]) On March 7 the UCproposal, supported by Stanford, Cal Tech, the University of Southern California, andthe California State University system, was on the table.It proposed UC as theadministrator, a system of outside peer review based on the National Institutes ofHealth model, a policy advisory committee, and full-cost reimbursement of indirectcosts  consistent with federal guidelines. [48]The research program was eventually authorized by Senator John Garamendi's (D-Walnut Grove) SB 1613 [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]