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.I begin, then, with the first point, and warn my readers to make an accurate distinction between an idea, orconception of the mind, and the images of things which imagine.It is further necessary that they shoulddistinguish between idea and words, whereby we signify, things.These three namely, images, words, andideas are by many persons either entirely confused together, or not distinguished with sufficient accuracy orAXIOMS.22 Ethics PART II: OF THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND.care, and hence people are generally in ignorance, how absolutely necessary is a knowledge of this doctrineof the will, both for philosophic purposes and for the wise ordering of life.Those who think that ideas consistin images which are formed in us by contact with external bodies, persuade themselves that the ideas of thosethings, whereof we can form no mental picture, are not ideas, but only figments, which we invent by the freedecree of our will; they thus regard ideas as though they were inanimate pictures on a panel, and, filled withthis misconception, do not see that an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea, involves an affirmation or negation.Again, those who confuse words with ideas, or with the affirmation which an idea involves, think that theycan wish something contrary to what they feel, affirm, or deny.This misconception will easily be laid asideby one, who reflects on the nature of knowledge, and seeing that it in no wise involves the conception ofextension, will therefore clearly understand, that an idea (being a mode of thinking) does not consist in theimage of anything, nor in words.The essence of words and images is put together by bodily motions, whichin no wise involve the conception of thought.These few words on this subject will suffice: I will therefore pass on to consider the objections, which may beraised against our doctrine.Of these, the first is advanced by those, who think that the will has a wider scopethan the understanding, and that therefore it is different therefrom.The reason for their holding the belief, thatthe will has wider scope than the understanding, is that they assert, that they have no need of an increase intheir faculty of assent, that is of affirmation or negation, in order to assent to an infinity of things which wedo not perceive, but that they have need of an increase in their faculty of understanding.The will is thusdistinguished from the intellect, the latter being finite and the former infinite.Secondly, it may be objectedthat experience seems to teach us especially clearly, that we are able to suspend our judgment beforeassenting to things which we perceive; this is confirmed by the fact that no one is said to be deceived, in sofar as he perceives anything, but only in so far as he assents or dissents.For instance, he who feigns a winged horse does not therefore admit that a winged horse exists; that is, he isnot deceived, unless he admits in addition that a winged horse does exist.Nothing therefore seems to betaught more clearly by experience, than that the will or faculty of assent is free and different from the facultyof understanding.Thirdly, it may be objected that one affirmation does not apparently contain more realitythan another; in other words, that we do not seem to need for affirming, that what is true is true, any greaterpower than for affirming, that what is false is true.We have, however, seen that one idea has more reality orperfection than another, for as objects are some more excellent than others, so also are the ideas of them somemore excellent than others; this also seems to point to a difference between the understanding and the will.Fourthly, it may be objected, if man does not act from free will, what will happen if the incentives to actionare equally balanced, as in the case of Buridan's ass? Will he perish of hunger and thirst? If I say that hewould, I shall seem to have in my thoughts an ass or the statue of a man rather than an actual man.If I saythat he would not, he would then determine his own action, and would consequently possess the faculty ofgoing and doing whatever he liked.Other objections might also be raised, but, as I am not bound to put inevidence everything that anyone may dream, I will only set myself to the task of refuting those I havementioned, and that as briefly as possible.To the first objection I answer, that I admit that the will has a wider scope than the understanding, if by theunderstanding be meant only clear and distinct ideas; but I deny that the will has a wider scope than theperceptions, and the faculty of forming conceptions; nor do I see why the faculty of volition should be calledinfinite, any more than the faculty of feeling: for, as we are able by the same faculty of volition to affirm aninfinite number of things (one after the other, for we cannot affirm an infinite number simultaneously), soalso can we, by the same faculty of feeling, feel or perceive (in succession) an infinite number of bodies.If itbe said that there is an infinite number of things which we cannot perceive, I answer, that we cannot attain tosuch things by any thinking, nor, consequently, by any faculty of volition.But, it may still be urged, if Godwished to bring it about that we should perceive them, he would be obliged to endow us with a greater facultyof perception, but not a greater faculty of volition than we have already.This is the same as to say that, if Godwished to bring it about that we should understand an infinite number of other entities, it would be necessaryAXIOMS.23 Ethics PART II: OF THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND.for him to give us a greater understanding, but not a more universal idea of entity than that which we havealready, in order to grasp such infinite entities.We have shown that will is a universal entity or idea, wherebywe explain all particular volitions in other words, that which is common to all such vohtions.As, then, our opponents maintain that this idea, common or universal to all volitions, is a faculty, it is little tobe wondered at that they assert, that such a faculty extends itself into the infinite, beyond the limits of theunderstanding: for what is universal is predicated alike of one, of many, and of an infinite number ofindividuals.To the second objection I reply by denying, that we have a free power of suspending our judgment: for, whenwe say that anyone suspends his judgment, we merely mean that he sees, that he does not perceive the matterin question adequately.Suspension of judgment is, therefore, strictly speaking, a perception, and not free will.In order to illustrate the point, let us suppose a boy imagining a horse, and perceiving nothing else.Inasmuchas this imagination involves the existence of the horse (II.xvii.Coroll.), and the boy does not perceiveanything which would exclude the existence of the horse, he will necessarily regard the horse as present: hewill not be able to doubt of its existence, although he be not certain thereof.We have daily experience of sucha state of things in dreams; and I do not suppose that there is anyone, who would maintain that, while he isdreaming, he has the free power of suspending his judgment concerning the things in his dream, and bringing,it about that he should not dream those things, which he dreams that he sees; yet it happens, notwithstanding,that even in dreams we suspend our judgment, namely, when we dream that we are dreaming [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]