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.S.entry into World WarI.The British did not reveal the source of their interception, and ahigh level of secrecy was to be characteristic of sigint operations.Analyses of Japanese messages were useful for U.S.delegates dur-ing the 1921 Naval Disarmament Conference in Washington, D.C.However, Secretary of War Henry Stimson closed the U.S.CipherBureau, saying that  gentlemen do not read each other s mail. TheU.S.Army continued with such operations.In 1940, army and navy cryptanalysts in Operation Magic brokethe Japanese Purple machine, by which Japan s diplomatic trafficwas encoded.This gave vital insights into Axis plans and activities,particularly in the messages from Japan s ambassador in Berlin.Although they cooperated to a degree in Magic, throughout WorldWar II the U.S.Army and U.S.Navy ran separate sigint operations:the navy through department OP-20-G, and the army in the signalsintelligence service.Coordination was limited and haphazard at first,but by 1944 it was more formalized through the Joint Army NavyCommunications Intelligence Coordinating Committee.Intelligencewas supplied to the White House and to the State Department.TheOffice of Strategic Services did not gather sigint, but the FederalBureau of Investigation and the Federal Communications Commis-sion both gathered materials.Signals intelligence made a major contribution to Allied for-tunes in World War II, though there were failures, notably over theattack on Pearl Harbor.One of the most significant diplomaticSINO JAPANESE WAR " 317aspects was the cooperation between the intelligence services ofthe United States and Great Britain.Formal liaison began in 1940,though the highly secret arrangements had been laid down as earlyas 1937.Initially it was over naval matters and took place throughthe U.S.Special Naval Observer in London.In 1941, it moved toanother level with the gift of a Purple machine from the UnitedStates to Britain, and the involvement of some U.S.personnel inthe British operation that was working against the German Enigmamachine.The material produced was known as Ultra.These Ul-tra-Magic arrangements were formalized in the Britain UnitedStates of America Agreement (BRUSA) in June 1943.From1943, another highly significant operation was under way, theVenona project, which decoded messages sent from the UnitedStates by the intelligence organization of the Union of SovietSocialist Republics.This provided vital information on Sovietespionage activities in the United States.SINO JAPANESE WAR (1937 1945).Since the 1931 ManchurianCrisis, militarists in Japan had been seeking further expansion inChina.By 1935, all of Manchuria and Jehol were under Japan s con-trol, and attempts had been made to move into Inner Mongolia.Fol-lowing a clash between Chinese and Japanese soldiers at the MarcoPolo Bridge near Peking (Beijing) on 7 July 1937, full-scale hostili-ties broke out.No declaration of war was made by either side.Japancalled it the  China Incident, and the lack of a declaration meantthat U.S.President Franklin D.Roosevelt could avoid invoking theNeutrality Act.This meant that U.S.companies could supply warmaterials to Chinese nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek, and U.S.businesses continued their activities in China.In December 1937, the river gunboat USS Panay, deployed origi-nally to protect the interests of a U.S.oil company, was bombed andsunk by Japanese aircraft, and American sailors were killed.The U.S.government accepted Japan s apology and indemnity, and its officialreaction to Japanese actions in the war was in line with the StimsonDoctrine of nonrecognition.This passivity was in accordance withadvice from the ambassador in Tokyo, Joseph C.Grew, who be-lieved the United States was too weak in the region and its interestsin the Philippines too vulnerable to provoke Japanese retaliation.It318 " SMITH ACTalso reflected U.S.economic interests as well, for Japan, not China,was the major U.S.trading partner in Asia.Japan overran northern China in the fall of 1937 and occupiedShanghai in November.Japanese forces advanced up the YangtzeRiver and along the main railroad lines.Chiang retreated, seeking totrade space for time.His capital, Nanking (Nanjing), fell in Decem-ber 1937, and a massacre known as the Rape of Nanking followed.Canton and Hankow fell in October 1938, but Chiang refused tocome to terms, based now far up-country in Chungking (Chonqqing).His supply routes, except for the Burma Road through Kunming,were severed when Japan occupied northern Indochina in fall 1940,during World War II, cutting the last rail line.The Burma Road wascut when Japan occupied Burma in early 1942.Chiang received help from the United States in the form of vol-unteers, in the American Volunteer Group.In an uneasy alliancewith the Chinese communists based in the north (operating as theEighth Route Army), Chiang continued resistance.He was grantedextensive aid from the United States through Lend-Lease and a loanfrom Congress.A million Japanese soldiers were tied down in Chinathroughout World War II [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]