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.In fact, priests held cabinet positions during[304], (824 the entire Sandinista experiment without renouncing their Catholic beliefs25 greater ideological pluralism than in Cuba was maintained in Nicaragua.1526 Similarly, the economy did not fall under a comparable ownership-control27 of the state.Nicaragua s state was a dictatorship with its consequent serious28 limitations to political pluralism, but it did not achieve Cuba s totalitarian29 heights.30 The favorable conditions to establish a Marxist-Leninist regime were not31 perceived to materialize.The revolution was faced with Ronald Reagan s elec-32 toral victory of November 1980 and with it an aggressive, anti-Sandinista U.S.33 military policy: the administration s firm commitment to the new so-called34 Contra war.Nicaragua s geography facilitated regime destabilization: it was35 not an island, but a nation with a history of porous borders.Provocative36 Sandinista policies (e.g., the assistance to El Salvador s Marxist guerrillas)37 notwithstanding, a proclamation of a Marxist-Leninist regime would have38 been exceedingly risky.39 Other international factors were operative.The cost of the victory against40 Somoza had left Nicaragua in a precarious economic situation.Although closeepilogue 3051 ties with the Cuba-Soviet axis were established, even before the accession of2 Gorbachev in 1985 it was clear that Nicaragua could not count on major So-3 viet support, in dramatic contrast with what had been the Cuban experience.4 Wealthy social democratic capitalist countries were helping Nicaragua finan-5 cially and were available to provide diplomatic support in the fight with the6 United States thus the inclination not to exalt Marxist-Leninist virtues when7 talking to such audiences.8 Some Latin American countries also played an important role.In 19839 Panama and Venezuela, which had been active in Somoza s overthrow, were10 joined by others, forming the Contadora Group to mediate the international11 Contra war.In sharp contrast to Cuba, after victory the Sandinistas continued12 to promise elections.That same year, in response to Contadora s initiatives[305], (9)13 autonomous from the United States, the Nicaraguan government agreed to14 advance elections to 1984.With international assistance the institutional orga-15 nization to conduct fair elections was being developed.Nonetheless, the San-Lines: 12716 dinista victory did not stop the U.S.-supported war opponents considered  17 the elections flawed.16 And the political and economic dysfunctions generated0.0pt Pg18 by the contradictions inherent in the fsln project of societal transformation  19 produced opposition against the government, including growth in its armedNormal Pa20 form.17 At the same time, the mandatory draft to fight the Contras producedPgEnds: TE21 popular dissatisfaction with the fsln.22 In the meantime some democratic progress was taking place in Central23 America.In 1982 constitutional elected government was restored in Honduras,[305], (9)24 and with the election in 1985 of Vinicio Cerezo, Guatemala began a period25 with elected civilian government.In 1987 a new peace initiative, the plan led26 by Costa Rican president Oscar Arias, took place also independently of the27 U.S.government.In contrast to the earlier discussed Costa Rican initiative28 of 1978, now Central American presidents coherently acted in coordination29 to pressure the Nicaraguan and U.S.governments to end the war.18 The plan30 contemplated among other items a cease-fire leading to demobilization; an31 end of military assistance to insurrections, including hosting bases for at-32 tacks against neighbor countries; reducing the size of the armed forces; free33 elections.As the Reagan administration was ending, the Soviet Union with34 Gorbachev s changes taking place in European Communism and the United35 States agreed to support the Central American initiative to end the war.36 Central America would gain from a peace accord.Costa Rica was faced37 with hosting massive immigration from Nicaragua and with the dangers of38 involvement in the war.El Salvador had priority in avoiding fsln support for39 its insurrection.Guatemala held similar concerns in trying to consolidate the40 democratic regime.Honduras faced the political tensions of the presence of306 epilogue1 U.S.troops in its territory and of the launching of the Contra war from inside2 its borders.All the countries were concerned with the imbalance posed by3 Nicaragua s militarization and the economic problems being created to the4 Central American Common Market.5 In sum, the revolution had resulted in a vulnerable regime that had a priority6 in economic reactivation and its survival, while better organizing the masses7 politically and militarily.A quick transition to a democratic regime was blocked8 by the weight of the new ideological influences and traditional reservations9 about democracy s viability in Nicaragua.19 But faced with war, the fsln had10 felt the need for coalitions and international support and to make concessions11 to survive.20 The regime had much to gain by accepting the Arias plan.There12 would be great benefit if the Contras disarmed.The economic situation was[306], (113 disastrous.The regime had lost internal support.If it won an internationally14 supervised election, the regime would be fully legitimized, and the war would15 end.Lines: 1316 Thus, in contrast to Somoza s decision, elections were advanced, and  17 contrary to Sandinista expectation, they lost.Violeta de Chamorro, Pedro0.0pt18 Joaquín s widow, became the opposition s candidate.21 Her motherly figure  19 symbolized pacifying Nicaragua, national reconciliation, repairing relationsNormal20 with the United States, getting substantial foreign assistance to create a betterPgEnds:21 nation.The stalemated, cruel,  low-intensity Contra war had not sufficed.22 The role played by multiple international political influences was essential in23 this democratic transition.[306], (12425 This book has focused on foreign relations between legally sovereign states26 that are supposed to have their own governments, not the politics of empire.27 Americans do not have the vocation for the latter, especially with its costs in28 the contemporary context of mobilized societies.We have focused on a special29 or particular type of interstate relations: international clientelism.Should the30 United States intervene or not (unilaterally or joined with others) supporting31 or opposing with various means foreign governments? Should the principle of32 non-intervention, of the absolute sovereignty of states to determine their own33 governments be a sacred prohibition? Should nations seek to constitute and34 maintain client-states? Although not a universal pattern, to this day foreign35 public and private actors are clientelistically involved in a number of countries.36 In discussing the nature of client-states we have in part traced their depen-37 dence on foreign support to the absence in them of broad domestic support38 for their own regimes [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]