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.M., the fighting had died down, and air sup-port no longer seemed like a useful option.12 Janvier askedthat a strong NATO air force be available for the next morning,but he stipulated it would be used only for CAS and only if theBSA used heavy weapons in their attack.13 Somehow the mes-sage was misconstrued or misinterpreted, so that the com-mander of the besieged peacekeepers expected massive airstrikes against the BSA forces surrounding the enclave on themorning of 11 July.14The next morning, NATO put up a package of approximately60 aircraft, including a dozen attack jets for the forward aircontrollers in the enclave.15 Below the orbiting air armada,General Ryan and Admiral Smith monitored the situationfrom a specially equipped command and control ship, the USSLassalle.16 At 10:00 A.M., with clear skies over Srebrenica, theDutch requested air support, but the anticipated Serb attackhad yet to materialize.17 Although the request was forwardedto General Janvier and Mr.Akashi shortly before 11:00 A.M.,the situation did not meet the criteria for air support specifiedby Janvier the night before.18 By 11:00 A.M.the package hadbeen holding in its orbit over the Adriatic for approximatelyfour hours and had reached the limit of its endurance.19 Soonafter the package of NATO aircraft began returning to Italy, thefinal Serb ground assault on Srebrenica began.20 The BosnianSerbs had evidently been tipped off through their air defensenetwork that the NATO planes were departing and would notbe available to provide air support.21 About an hour after thefinal assault began and while NATO aircraft were being serv-iced in preparation for an afternoon package, General Janviersigned a   Blue Sword  order authorizing CAS.22The Serbs moved quickly to take the city, and as the enclave sMuslim defenders made for the hills in an effort to escape thehopeless situation, the Dutch peacekeepers found themselvessurrounded, outgunned, and swamped by refugees.23 Severalpeacekeepers had been taken hostage by the BSA in the firstdays of the assault, but from the outset, everyone inSrebrenica was a virtual hostage.At around 2:30 P.M., two248SREBRENICA AND THE DECISIONS TO USE AIRPOWERDutch F-16s, guided by a Dutch forward air controller, exe-cuted attacks against two tanks just south of the town.24 Thenext flight into the area was a pair of USAF F-16s, but thepilots failed to find their target an artillery piece in a heavilywooded area.25 Following the attacks on the tanks, the Serbsthreatened to kill the peacekeepers they were holding hostageand to shell the civilians and soldiers in the enclave unless theair attacks ceased.26 With another batch of fighters scheduledinto the Srebrenica area, the news raced up the Dutchnational chain of command; Defense Minister Voorhoevephoned directly from The Hague to a Dutch officer at NATO sair operations center in Vicenza and ordered an immediateend to air operations.27 Left out of the decision-making loop,the NATO commanders aboard the Lassalle were caught bysurprise.28 General Ryan insisted on going ahead with theattacks, but the forward air controller on the ground honoredthe demands of the Dutch government and ordered the NATOaircraft away.29Within days, Srebrenica was   ethnically cleansed  of itsMuslim population, and 23,000 more women and childrenbecame refugees of the war.Herded, with methodical Serbassistance, to the town of Potocari just north of Srebrenica,the women and children then moved westward, out of BosnianSerb-held territory, to Kladanj.30 Thousands of men wentmissing during the cleansing and were presumably killed.31When the Bosnian Serbs finished with Srebrenica, they movedon to the safe area of Zepa, 12 miles to the southeast.Expectations and BlameThe fall of Srebrenica demonstrated the unrealistic expecta-tions of airpower that some people held participants andobservers.On the night before Srebrenica fell, the Dutch bat-talion commander thought massive air strikes would forceMladic to back off, or make the BSA suffer grave consequenceswith   bombing everywhere.  32 David Rohde later claimed that   ifNATO close air support had been used earlier,.the 7,079missing might still be alive today.  33 Neither air strikes, norclose air support would have made that much difference atSrebrenica.Airpower alone could not defend the safe areas, as249RESPONSIBILITY OF COMMANDsenior NATO and UN commanders had been warning since thespring of 1993 [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]