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.Egypt s persistentopposition to the pact led Menderes to make allegations about the emergence of pro-Soviet tendencies in the Egyptian administration.18 The government did not hesitateto refer to a private meeting between the Egyptian Ambassador and the Soviet Chargéd Affaires in Ankara as a serious sign of Nasser s pro-Soviet orientation.However,the Menderes government was disappointed with the fact that its allies did not seemvery alarmed with the Egyptians closeness to the Soviets.Ankara was especiallydisillusioned with the allies handling of the Egyptian Czech arms deal.Accordingto the government, Nasser was not punished, but rewarded with financial backingfollowing the arms deal.19 They thought that this could set a bad example in the areaby displaying that opposition to the pact might pay as much, or even more, thanbeing a supporter of it.The decision to finance Nasser s Aswan Dam project addedanother twist to Turkey s disappointment.At the time, the Turks also had a specialreason to feel unhappy about the financial support offered to Nasser because theirown request from the Americans for a $300,000,000 loan had been rejected only ashort while before.20 Indeed, from the mid-1950s, Turkey US economic relationsbegan to face marked vicissitudes.The Baghdad Pact displayed the deep Egyptian Turkish divide in the region,but it also strengthened Turkey s understanding of British politics in the areadue to Britain s accession to the pact.Turkey did not hesitate to co-operate withBritain in the Baghdad Pact, and called for increasing American commitment tothe organization together with Britain.Meanwhile, Turkey failed to understand howstrong anti-British, anti-colonial feelings were in the region.This was mainly a resultof Turkey s having no colonial past.Turkey appreciated Britain s membership of thepact, while the US dragged its feet over adhering.Turkish Egyptian perceptions of the bipolarized world order increasingly causedcontroversy in their respective Middle Eastern policies, and became especiallyevident in the historic meeting of Afro-Asian countries at Bandung in April 1955.Turkish leaders found Nasser s resistance to the pact pointless since they regardedhis idea of following a neutralist foreign policy in a bipolarized world unrealistic.In contrast with Nasser s statements in favour of neutralism, the head of the Turkishdelegation in Bandung, Turkish Foreign Minister Fatin Rü_
tü Zorlu, tried to provethe point that at the height of the Cold War, trying to pursue a neutralist foreignpolicy was very risky for the welfare of the countries of Africa and Asia.21 Thus, theleaders of the two countries had been pursuing and promoting policies in the MiddleEast which were incompatible.While Nasser was trying to reduce his country s17 Ankara to FO, 14 October 1955, TNA, FO 371/115524.18 Bowker to Shuckburgh, 14 February 1955, TNA, FO 371/115461.19 Stewart to Wright, 19 March 1956, TNA, FO 371/121272.20 19 June 1955, NARA, RG 59, Central-Decimal File, 782.00(W)/1 555.21 S.Günver, Fatin Rü_
tü Zorlu nun Hikayesi (Ankara, 1985), pp.52 4; Z.Kuneralp,Sadece Diplomat (Istanbul, 1981), pp.107 13.130 Reassessing Suez 1956dependence on the West, Turkey, on the other hand, was keen on strengtheningits ties and promoting Western policies in the area.Unlike Turkey, Egypt was notpreoccupied with the Soviet threat.Nasser s main concern was Israel.At the time when Egypt was willing to establish itself as the leader of the Arabworld, Turkey was promoting itself as a major player in Middle Eastern politics.Turkey s assumption of an active role in the region coincided with its increasingcommitment to the West.As a result, Turkey by and large was perceived as the promoterof Western interests rather than an indigenous player in the area.This also became astumbling block to any serious improvement in Turkish Egyptian relations.The Turkish government was not only assuming an influential role itself, butalso backing Iraq in the historic leadership contest between the Iraqis and theEgyptians in the Arab world.Unlike the troublesome relations between Nasserand Menderes, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Said and Premier Menderes developeda very close relationship which became an important incentive for the conclusionof the Baghdad Pact between Turkey and Iraq.Nuri was the representative of theex-Ottoman generation.He studied at the Military Academy in Istanbul, spokevery good Turkish, but he did not remember his past experience with the Ottomansparticularly favourably.22 Nevertheless, his firm commitment to have a goodrelationship with the West, and Menderes s personal involvement with the Iraqipremier, overshadowed Nuri s distrust of the Turks, and he worked side by side withthe Turkish leadership for the establishment of the Baghdad Pact [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]