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.If it is bad forthese people that others are acting in the same way as them as would betrue, for example, in some anarchic war of all against all these peoplecould not rationally will the continuation of the status quo.But, if thestatus quo is good for these people, we may face the following problem.The status quo may be good for these people in part because their badmaxim is universal.Those to whom some maxim applies may be somepowerful and privileged group, who are oppressing other people.Kant s Formula condemns these people s acts only if they could notrationally will that they keep their privileged position.And, for the rea-sons given above, we cannot defend such claims in ways that assumethat these people s acts are wrong.Nor can we appeal to the claim thatthese people are rationally required to give signi`
cant weight to otherpeople s well-being.When we apply Kant s Formula, we must claimthat it would be nonmorally irrational for such people to will that theykeep their privileged position.Such claims may be hard to defend.Nor would it help to turn to the moral belief version of Kant s For-mula.If these people could rationally will that everyone acts in the sameway as them, they could rationally will that everyone believes such actsto be permissible.They would have no relevant reason to prefer thateveryone believes their acts to be wrong.Consider, for example, those men who treat women as inferior, deny-ing them various rights and privileges, and giving less weight to theirwell-being.On Kant s Formula, it is wrong for men to act in this wayunless they could rationally will it to be true that everyone acts in thisway, and that everyone believes such acts to be justi`
ed.That is not auseful claim.For most of history, most people, including most women,have treated women as inferior, and believed such treatment to bejusti`
ed.Many men could rationally will that they keep their privilegedposition, and that everyone believes that position to be justi`
ed.Simi-larly, in condemning slavery, it would not help to claim that slave-owners acted wrongly unless they could have rationally willed, onnonmoral grounds, that they keep their slaves, and willed that everyone,including slaves, believes slavery to be justi`
ed.In considering suchcases, we would do better to appeal to the Golden Rule, which Kantcontemptuously dismissed.Men and slave-owners would not will that636-p.qxd 4/19/2004 2:00 PM Page 333[Parfit] What We Could Rationally Will 333they be treated as inferior, or as mere property, if they supposed thatthey themselves were going to be women or slaves.For another example, consider global inequality.On any plausiblemoral view, those who control most of the world s resources ought totransfer some of their wealth to the billion poorest people in the world.Many rich people now transfer nothing to the poor.Kant s Formula doesnot condemn these people s acts if they could rationally will it to be truethat all rich people act like them, and that everyone, including the poor,believes such acts to be justi`
ed.As before, Kant s Formula hereachieves nothing.It might be suggested that, if we redescribe these kinds of acts,Kant s Formula would do better.For example, when some man treatswomen as inferior, he is treating members of the opposite sex as inferior.In willing that everyone acts in this way, this man would be willing, notonly that all men treat women as inferior, but also that all women treatmen as inferior.Since men have more power, however, that redescriptionmay not make enough difference.And there are many cases in whichsuch redescriptions would be no help.We might say that, when the richtransfer nothing to the poor, they are giving nothing to those whose`
nancial position is the opposite of theirs.That would allow us to claimthat, in willing that everyone acts in this way, the rich would in part bewilling that the poor give nothing to them.But the rich could happilywill such a world, since the poor have nothing to give.Similarly, whenthe strong exploit the weak, it would not help to say that the strong areexploiting others, and that, if everyone acted in this way, others wouldexploit them.If the weak tried to exploit the strong, they would notsucceed.When Korsgaard discusses Kant s Formula of Universal Law, shewrites:the kind of case around which the view is framed, and which it han-dles best, is the temptation to make oneself an exception, sel`
shness,mean-ness, advantage-taking, and disregard for the rights of others.It is this sort of thing, not violent crimes born of despair or illness,that serves as Kant s model of immoral conduct.I do not think wecan fault him on this, for this and not the other is the sort of evil thatmost people are tempted by in their ordinary lives.5555CKE, p.101.636-p.qxd 4/19/2004 2:00 PM Page 334334 The Tanner Lectures on Human ValuesWhat Kant s view handles best is not, I have argued, all kinds of sel`
sh-ness or advantage-taking.Kant s Formula fails to condemn many of theacts with which some people take advantage of others as when men,the rich, and the powerful take advantage of women, the poor, and theweak.And, since Kant presents his formula as the supreme principle ofmorality, we can fault this formula for its failure to condemn such acts.These kinds of sel`
shness and advantage-taking are precisely the sorts ofevil that the rich and powerful are tempted by, and often commit, intheir ordinary lives.9Some may think that, in presenting this objection, I have misinter-preted Kant s Formula.Thomas Nagel suggests that, when we askwhether we could rationally will that everyone acts in the same way asus, Kant intends us to imagine that we ourselves are going to be ineveryone else s position.56 This suggestion makes Kant s Formula morelike the Golden Rule.None of Kant s claims about his formula support Nagel s reading.57And there are contrary passages, such as Kant s discussion of the self-reliant man who has the maxim of not helping others who are in need.When he explains why this man could not rationally will that hismaxim be a universal law, Kant writes:many cases could occur in which& by such a law of nature arisenfrom his own will, he would rob himself of all hope of the assistance hewishes for himself.58If Kant intended this man to imagine that he would be in the positionsof all of the people who would need help, it would be hard to explainwhy Kant doesn t say that here.Nagel defends his reading with the claim that, if Kant did not in-tend us to imagine being in everyone else s position, Kant s Formulawould be open to serious objections.But even the greatest philosophers56Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality (Oxford University Press, 1991), pp.42 43.57Kant does write:  every rational being& must always take his maxims from the pointof view of himself, and likewise every other rational being (G, p.438).But this remarkcomes in Kant s discussion of the Formula of the Kingdom of Ends, to which I shall return.58G, p.423 (my emphases).636-p.qxd 4/19/2004 2:00 PM Page 335[Parfit] What We Could Rationally Will 335can overlook possible objections.We should not assume that, whengreat philosophers seem to make some mistake, they cannot have meantwhat they wrote.John Rawls proposes another reading of Kant s Formula.When weapply this formula, Rawls suggests, Kant intends us to imagine that wedon t know anything about ourselves or our circumstances [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]