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.While priding themselves on their refined moral sensibility and reserving theright to criticize American power, they enjoyed the safety of the Americansecurity umbrella, protected by American power from the vast world that  has yetto accept the rule of  moral consciousness.  109Kagan cautioned that the recent upsurge of American unipolarism was not thecause of the estrangement between Europeans and Americans.By 2002,European leaders and intellectuals across the Continent were desperatelynostalgic for Clinton, but during the 19908 they cursed Clinton and especiallySecretary of State Madeleine Albright as imperialists. It was during the 1990sthat Europeans began to view the United States as a  hectoring hegemon,  herecalled; Védrine coined the term  hyperpower to describe the bullyingAmerican colossus of the Clinton years.110Kagan wanted the Europeans to return to history, significantly increasing theirmilitary capability.At the same time, he counseled American leaders to stopworrying about European criticism.The Europeans had their own reasons forfleeing from history, and having done so, they had little to say that made anysense outside their post-historical paradise.More important, they had no powerto threaten the United States.Rather than worry about Europe s designs to tiedown the American hyperpower,  American leaders should realize that they arehardly constrained at all, that Europe is not really capable of constraining theUnited States. America is so powerful that it can afford to be understanding ofthe European perspective, Kagan counseled.When America had to defy Europe,it could do so with impunity; the rest of the time America was well advised toshow some respect for the opinion of its European friends.111Kagan s description of Europe s Kantian peace was overdrawn and German-centered.He ignored that England and France still regarded themselves as greatpowers, that both countries were far from unwilling to use military force, and thatmost European nations had supported America s numerous military interventionsof the past twenty years.His oversimplistic dichotomizing irritated foreign policyspecialists, partly because the book made a huge success.Of Paradise andPower found a wide audience in the United States and Europe.It helped that thebook was not only interesting, perceptive, and brief, but untypically irenic; BENEVOLENT GLOBAL HEGEMONY 153Kagan usually didn t appeal to American sensitivity or commend thereasonableness of European multilateralists.112More typically he complained elsewhere that European leaders flunked thetest of mutual respect when they discussed the International Criminal Court (ICC).The treaty establishing the court went into effect on July 1, 2002, but the Bushadministration revoked Clinton s endorsement of it, claiming that Americansserving as peacekeepers had to be immune from prosecution.European leaderscontended that the court would not be credible if it did not operate by a singlestandard of justice.Kagan defended Bush s position, arguing that the UnitedStates was not like any other country, and that the United States could participatein the International Criminal Court only if ultimate authority was vested in theU.N.Security Council, where the United States had a veto.The United Statesdeserved the special protection of a double standard, because only the UnitedStates is constantly called upon to stabilize countries in turmoil:  America sentire global strategy is built around projecting military power anywhere at anytime, which means the United States is always going to have far more soldiersvulnerable to some misguided ICC prosecutor than any other nation. Moreover,as the world s dominant power, the United States is resented by countries aroundthe world; everywhere people are jealous of America.Kagan observed:  Eventhose who believe the ICC is a good idea have to admit, if they re honest, that theUnited States is going to be more vulnerable than other powers. Thus, theUnited States had no business submitting to the ICC if it could not get anexemption from it [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]